Precursor Security
Remote Access Security Assessment

VPN Security Review

VPN gateways are the primary initial access vector for ransomware. Misconfigured authentication, split tunnelling enabled for convenience, and legacy protocols left on for backwards compatibility: these are the gaps threat actors find first. We review your Cisco AnyConnect, GlobalProtect, Citrix ADC, or FortiGate deployment against current attack techniques. From £2,500 for a single gateway.

CREST-Accredited Assessment
Black Box + White Box Hybrid
MFA Bypass & Portal Testing
Cisco, Palo Alto, Citrix & Fortinet
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Vendor Security Features vs Expert Review

Beyond Vendor Defaults

Vendor Default Security

Built-in Features

  • Defaults prioritise connectivity over security
  • MFA bypass for service accounts not tested
  • No adversarial authentication testing
  • Split tunnelling risk not contextualised
  • Not accepted as independent audit evidence
Expert VPN Review

CREST-Accredited Assessment

  • Black box portal + white box config review
  • MFA bypass and service account testing
  • IKEv1, weak cipher, and legacy protocol audit
  • Post-connect authorisation validation
  • Compliance-mapped report for insurers and auditors
Risk Intelligence

The Ransomware Gateway

Critical
60%

INITIAL ACCESS VIA VPN/RDP

Of ransomware attacks start with compromised VPN or RDP credentials. VPN gateways are the primary target for initial access operations against UK organisations.

High
Hours

CVE-TO-EXPLOIT WINDOW

Critical SSL VPN vulnerabilities (Citrix Bleed, Fortinet CVE-2024-21762) are weaponised within hours of public disclosure. Patching alone is insufficient without configuration hardening.

Insurer
No MFA

INSURER RED FLAG

Single-factor authentication on VPN gateways is now classified as negligent by most UK cyber insurers, and is the configuration most commonly exploited in ransomware initial access.

Mapped
Controls
Cyber EssentialsBoundary Gateways
ISO 27001Annex A.8.20
PCI DSSRequirement 2
NIS2 / CSR BillNetwork Security
When to Commission

When to Commission a VPN Review

Most VPN security reviews are triggered by an insurer questionnaire, a CVE disclosure, or a compliance deadline. If any of these scenarios describe your situation, an independent review provides the evidence you need.

Cyber Insurance Questionnaire

Your insurer has asked whether VPN gateways have been independently assessed in the last 12 months. The honest answer is never. Single-factor VPN authentication is now classified as negligent by most UK cyber insurers.

Post-CVE Disclosure Mandate

After a critical SSL VPN CVE disclosure (Citrix Bleed, Fortinet, Ivanti), your CISO has mandated independent assessment of all VPN gateways. You need testing within weeks, not months, and the scope must cover both the vulnerability and the broader configuration.

Compliance Audit Deadline

ISO 27001 Annex A.8.20, PCI DSS Requirement 2, or Cyber Essentials Plus certification requires documented evidence of network security controls including independent VPN review. The audit is approaching and the evidence pack is incomplete.

ZTNA Migration Validation

You are migrating from traditional VPN to Zero Trust (Zscaler, Prisma Access, Cloudflare Access) but running both in parallel during transition. You need verification that the legacy VPN pathways have been properly decommissioned and ZTNA policies enforce the intended access model.

Inherited VPN Infrastructure

You have inherited a VPN estate from a predecessor team or offboarded MSP. The configuration was deployed during the remote work transition and never hardened. MFA enforcement is patchy, split tunnelling was enabled for convenience, and nobody can confirm the baseline.

Board Accountability

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill introduces fines up to £17M or 4% of turnover for inadequate network security controls. The board needs demonstrable evidence that remote access infrastructure has been independently assessed.

Common Findings

What We Typically Find

Across every VPN estate we review, the same misconfigurations appear. These are not theoretical risks. They are findings our consultants document in reports issued to UK organisations every month.

Critical
Authentication

Service account bypasses MFA via RADIUS fallback

A service account used for automated monitoring has MFA exempted in the RADIUS configuration. The account has full VPN access and its credentials are stored in a shared password vault. An attacker with access to the vault credential can authenticate to the VPN without any second factor.

CVSS 9.1NIST AC-7
Business ImpactFull corporate network access via single-factor service account
Critical
Legacy Protocol

IKEv1 Aggressive Mode enables offline PSK cracking

The IPsec VPN is configured with IKEv1 Aggressive Mode, which transmits the hashed pre-shared key in cleartext during the initial handshake. An attacker on the network path can capture this hash and crack the PSK offline using GPU-accelerated tools. The PSK has not been rotated since initial deployment.

CVSS 8.8NIST SC-8
Business ImpactOffline credential recovery enabling full VPN access
Critical
Patching

SSL VPN portal running firmware with known RCE CVE

The SSL VPN portal is running a firmware version vulnerable to a known remote code execution exploit with publicly available proof-of-concept code. Exploitation requires no authentication and grants the attacker shell access to the VPN appliance, enabling credential harvesting of all connected sessions.

CVSS 9.8CVE-2024-21762
Business ImpactUnauthenticated remote code execution on the VPN appliance
High
Tunnelling

Split tunnelling active on all user profiles

Split tunnelling is enabled for all VPN connection profiles. Corporate traffic routes through the VPN tunnel, but all other traffic exits directly from the user's local network. A compromised remote device bridges the corporate network to the user's home network, providing lateral movement from untrusted environments.

CVSS 7.5NIST SC-7
Business ImpactCorporate network bridged to untrusted home networks
High
Portal

VPN portal discloses software version and internal hostname

The SSL VPN login portal returns the appliance firmware version and internal hostname in HTTP response headers and error pages. Attackers use version disclosure to identify specific CVEs applicable to the deployment and target exploits accordingly.

CVSS 5.3OWASP A05
Business ImpactTargeted exploit selection via version fingerprinting
High
Authorisation

All VPN users land in the same network zone post-connect

Every authenticated VPN user, regardless of role or department, receives the same network access: full Layer 3 connectivity to the production server subnet. No post-authentication authorisation policies restrict access based on user group, device posture, or business function.

CVSS 7.0ISO A.8.20
Business ImpactNo least-privilege enforcement for remote access users

Most VPN gateways we review have at least one Critical and three or more High findings on first independent assessment.

VPN Hardening Methodology

What We Test

Ransomware groups specifically target VPN gateways for initial access. We assess your remote access infrastructure against the techniques they use, from credential stuffing against the login portal to IKEv1 aggressive mode pre-shared key extraction. Assessment covers all major VPN platforms and includes compliance mapping for Cyber Essentials Plus, ISO 27001 A.8.20, and PCI DSS Requirement 2.

Authentication

Authentication Strength

We verify MFA enforcement across all account types, including service accounts, admin accounts, and break-glass users frequently excluded from MFA policy. We test for authentication downgrade attacks, RADIUS configuration weaknesses, and timing oracle attacks used to enumerate valid usernames without triggering account lockout.

Tunnelling

Split Tunnelling

We identify whether split tunnelling is enabled and document the access consequence: a compromised remote device with split tunnelling active bridges your corporate network to whatever the user's home network contains. We also test for Local LAN Access settings that are frequently enabled by default and overlooked in post-deployment reviews.

Legacy Crypto

Legacy Protocols

We identify support for deprecated encryption suites (3DES, RC4, DES), weak Diffie-Hellman groups, and IKEv1 Aggressive Mode which allows offline PSK cracking. These are not theoretical: IKEv1 Aggressive Mode is actively used in VPN credential attacks observed in the wild.

Portal Surface

Portal Exposure

We check the web portal for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, including session hijacking, information disclosure, and clientless VPN injection. Version disclosure vulnerabilities in SSL VPN portals have been used in critical exploits including Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) and Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2024-21762).

Authorisation

Post-Connect Access

We validate authorisation policies. Does a 'Sales' user get full network access, or are they restricted to just the CRM subnet? Post-connect access controls are frequently misconfigured in environments where VPN deployment was rushed during the remote work transition and never revisited.

Zero Trust

ZTNA Policy Validation

For organisations using Zscaler Private Access, Palo Alto Prisma Access, or Cloudflare Access, we verify that conditional access policies enforce the intended access model, and that legacy VPN pathways have not been left open alongside the ZTNA deployment.

Platform Coverage

VPN Platforms We Assess

We assess all major VPN and ZTNA platforms. Our consultants have hands-on experience with each vendor's authentication model, not generic methodology applied to unknown platforms.

Cisco AnyConnect

ASA/FTD-based SSL VPN, SAML/RADIUS authentication, posture assessment

Palo Alto GlobalProtect

PAN-OS gateway, HIP checks, split tunnelling policy, Prisma Access

Citrix ADC / NetScaler

Citrix Gateway, clientless VPN, Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) testing

Fortinet FortiGate

SSL VPN, IPsec VPN, FortiClient EMS, CVE-2024-21762 assessment

SonicWall

SSL VPN portal, NetExtender, SMA appliance configuration

Ivanti Connect Secure

Pulse Secure / Ivanti, CVE-2024-21887 assessment, integrity checking

Zscaler Private Access

ZTNA conditional access, application segmentation, legacy VPN coexistence

Palo Alto Prisma Access

Cloud-delivered security, GlobalProtect integration, policy validation

Engagement Pipeline

Assessment Workflow

From portal enumeration to a compliance-ready report. A hybrid black box + white box assessment lifecycle.

Step 01

Portal Enumeration

We map all external VPN entry points (Cisco AnyConnect, GlobalProtect, Citrix ADC, FortiGate, SonicWall, Ivanti) and fingerprint software versions against current CVE advisories. Version disclosure vulnerabilities in SSL VPN portals have been used in critical exploits including Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) and Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2024-21762).

Step 02

Authentication Testing

We attempt to identify valid usernames via timing attacks and test for weak password policies or lack of account lockout throttling. Credential stuffing, MFA bypass attempts, portal vulnerability assessment, and session hijacking tests are performed from an external attacker perspective.

Step 03

Configuration Audit

VPN configurations accumulate risk over time: exception policies for executives, service accounts added without MFA, and vendor-default settings left unchanged for backwards compatibility. We assess the live configuration against current hardening benchmarks, not just the original build documentation.

Step 04

Risk Report

We deliver a clear report detailing exactly how an attacker could compromise your remote access and the specific settings to fix it. Reports are mapped to Cyber Essentials Plus, ISO 27001 A.8.20, and PCI DSS Requirement 2, and are suitable for presenting to auditors, insurers, or the board.

Deliverables

What You Receive

Every VPN security review includes the following deliverables, formatted for technical remediation teams, compliance stakeholders, and insurer submission.

Executive summary written for board, CISO, and insurer presentation
Full findings register with each issue rated Critical, High, Medium, or Low
Authentication assessment covering MFA enforcement, service accounts, and bypass vectors
Encryption and protocol audit with specific cipher suite recommendations
Split tunnelling and post-connect access control analysis
Portal vulnerability assessment including CVE exposure and version disclosure
Compliance mapping to Cyber Essentials Plus, ISO 27001 A.8.20, and PCI DSS Req 2
Retesting within the assessment window to confirm remediated findings at no additional cost

Reports are delivered in PDF format. Single-gateway reviews typically complete within 2-3 business days.

After Testing

Detect Credential Attacks in Real Time.

A VPN security review is a point-in-time assessment. Credential attacks happen continuously. Feed assessment findings directly into detection rules that alert on authentication anomalies, MFA bypass attempts, and VPN configuration changes as they occur.

Discuss Your Requirements
Service Catalogue

Full Penetration Testing Catalogue

Comprehensive penetration testing services tailored to your environment.

Ready to Secure

The best time to test your defences is now.

Join the high-growth companies relying on Precursor for continuous offensive and defensive security.

CREST Triple Accredited|Fixed Price Quotes|Free Scoping Call|UK Based Team

Frequently Asked Questions

Common questions about this service, methodologies, and deliverables.

VPN security review pricing typically ranges from £2,500 to £8,000+ depending on gateway complexity and scope. Single VPN gateway reviews (Cisco AnyConnect, GlobalProtect, Citrix ADC) average £2,500-£4,500 including authentication testing, encryption audit, and split tunnelling analysis. Multi-gateway environments (2-4 VPN concentrators, multiple authentication methods) typically cost £4,500-£6,000. Enterprise reviews (5+ gateways, ZTNA integration, complex conditional access policies) typically cost £6,000-£8,000+. Pricing includes portal vulnerability assessment and MFA bypass testing. We provide fixed quotes after understanding your VPN infrastructure and authentication architecture.

The most frequently exploited VPN vulnerabilities observed in UK ransomware incidents are: (1) Credential-based attacks: password spraying and credential stuffing against the VPN portal login, exploiting weak or absent MFA; (2) Unpatched CVEs: critical SSL VPN vulnerabilities including Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966), Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2024-21762), and Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2024-21887) are often weaponised within hours of public disclosure; (3) IKEv1 Aggressive Mode: enables offline pre-shared key recovery in IPsec VPN configurations; (4) Split tunnelling abuse: compromised remote devices with split tunnelling active provide a bridgehead into the corporate network; (5) Service account MFA gaps: admin and service accounts frequently excluded from MFA enforcement policy. A VPN security review tests for all of these against your specific gateway configuration.

It is a hybrid engagement combining black box authentication testing with white box configuration review. The black box phase tests your VPN portal from an external attacker's perspective: credential stuffing, MFA bypass attempts, portal vulnerability assessment, and session hijacking tests. The white box phase reviews your backend configuration for insecure defaults, legacy protocol support, split tunnelling policy, and post-authentication access controls. This hybrid approach identifies both the vulnerabilities an attacker can reach without credentials, and the misconfiguration they would exploit after establishing access. A standalone penetration test without the configuration review will miss insecure settings that are not externally detectable. A configuration review without the authentication testing will miss vulnerabilities in the portal's attack surface.

Yes. Citrix NetScaler/ADC (now Citrix ADC) is one of the most frequently targeted VPN platforms in UK enterprise environments. We test for Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) and related session token disclosure vulnerabilities, clientless VPN injection, and gateway policy misconfigurations that permit unauthorised lateral movement. We also test Citrix Secure Private Access (ZTNA) deployments where organisations are running both the legacy ADC gateway and a newer ZTNA solution in parallel.

A VPN security review directly supports compliance with several frameworks: Cyber Essentials Plus requires independent assessment of boundary firewalls and internet gateways, including VPN configuration. Our review generates the evidence required for certification. ISO 27001 Annex A.8.20 (network security controls) requires documented assessment of network access controls, including remote access mechanisms. PCI DSS Requirement 2 mandates removal of vendor defaults and hardening of all system components, which includes VPN gateways used in cardholder data environments. NIS2 and the incoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill require demonstrable network security controls for operators of essential services and regulated supply chain organisations. We provide a structured report mapped to the relevant framework controls, suitable for presenting to auditors, insurers, or the board.

A single-gateway VPN security review (one VPN platform, one authentication method) typically completes in 2-3 days: one day for external black box testing, one day for configuration review, and one day for report writing and quality assurance. Multi-gateway reviews (2-4 VPN concentrators) typically take 3-5 days. Enterprise engagements involving multiple VPN technologies and ZTNA integration are scoped individually but typically complete within 2 weeks. We can accommodate accelerated timelines for urgent requirements. If you are facing an insurer deadline or regulatory audit, contact us and we will scope accordingly.

Vendor-enabled security features do not guarantee secure deployment: (1) Default configurations prioritise connectivity over security. 'Enable Local LAN Access' is often left on, (2) MFA may be enforced for users but bypass mechanisms exist for 'System' or service accounts, (3) Split tunnelling decisions require business context that vendors cannot assess, (4) Legacy protocol support (IKEv1, weak ciphers) may be enabled for backward compatibility without review, (5) Post-authentication authorisation (what can users actually access?) requires adversarial testing, and (6) VPNs are the primary ransomware entry point. Attackers actively hunt for misconfigurations. External review provides the adversarial perspective and independent validation that vendor tooling cannot deliver.

We also audit ZTNA solutions (like Zscaler Private Access, Palo Alto Prisma Access, or Cloudflare Access), verifying that conditional access policies enforce the intended access model and that legacy VPN pathways have not been left open alongside the ZTNA deployment.

Ideally, yes. We request a test account to verify 'Post-Connect' authorisation rules: what a user can actually access once authenticated. This is the phase of the review that most often reveals over-permissioned access and segmentation failures.